"In testimony to the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, General Votel and Secretary Lumpkin expressed their concern about the impact of sequestration on the forces provided by the Services to USSOCOM, which is often referred to as enabling forces or “enablers.”
"This example [regarding HSC-84 & HSC-85] cited by General Votel is likely just one of a number of examples of how sequestration-associated force structure cuts have the potential to negatively affect USSOCOM training and, possibly, operational effectiveness. "
"Flying SOF missions requires skills that go beyond flying maritime missions. “We have to make sure these guys are trained well for the types of missions that they will be conducting,” said Reams. “Just because it spins on the top and can go faster than a truck is good, but if the guy can’t hover as guys are fast-roping, then he’s more danger than he is worth.”
"The performance of the Red Wolves of Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron Eight Four has been a particularly impressive demonstration of the powerful effects that can be achieved by high quality aircrews in a sustained partnership with ground forces conducting challenging missions under extremely demanding conditions."
"Naval Special Warfare Command's Validated Requirements for Navy RW are significantly under-resourced."
"[HSC-84] aircrews are among the unsung heroes of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Long-time members of SOF describe them as superbly qualified, at a standard approaching the Army's famed Night Stalkers."
"Navy must adapt to support the operations of its service counterparts and the mission at hand. With Navy special operations identified as an issue of concern, these forces would benefit tremendously from an aviation unit dedicated to their mission. Their requirements demand a special operations helicopter unit."
Within the past decade, both the U.S. Navy and U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have undergone considerable transformation. The Navy has shifted its focus from a Mahanian, fleet on fleet, blue water engagement to the brown waters of the littorals. Since receiving the designation as the lead Combatant Command for synchronizing, planning, and executing worldwide operations in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) has increased its capacity to become rapidly deployable, agile, flexible, and tailorable to perform the most demanding and sensitive missions. In both cases, the operational utility of the helicopter operating “from the sea” has increased significantly. Guided by SOF theory and doctrine, influenced by the current and future threat environment, and molded after the combat-proven, habitual relationship formed between Navy helicopter squadrons and Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) forces during the Vietnam War; the Navy should designate specific rotary wing assets as SOF under the guidance of Naval Special Warfare Command (NAVSPECWAR). With a legitimate, dedicated naval helicopter SOF asset, NAVSPECWAR can maximize SOF training and operational missions in support of the Operational Commander’s time-critical mission requirements. Implementation of this recommendation will ensure a truly joint SOF aviation capability, increase the supply of high demand, low density SOF rotary wing assets, and dramatically improve the operational effectiveness of SOF operations.
"Furthermore, the professionalism and combat effectiveness displayed by both squadrons during 2nd Quarter FY-04 enabled them to singularly execute 82% of all SOF combat missions in Iraq, while other SOF aviation assets were tasked with logistical assignments."
"Finally...Combatant Commander staffs should closely examine current Naval Special Operations aviation force structure and ensure its survivability throughout future budget cuts."